Dynamic configuration of a gaming system

ABSTRACT

A method to enable dynamic configuration of gaming terminals installed in one or a plurality of gaming premises whereby certified games, certified data files and certified support software components are activated in accordance with a predetermined schedule or automatically in response to the observed gaming activity. The method may include allocating an individual PKI certificate to each executable software component and each of its versions, binding the PKI certificate to the executable software, associating a distinctive policy for each certificate and then enforcing the software execution policies in accordance with the desired authorized game configuration and schedule. The PKI certificate&#39;s “Subject Name” (or “Issued to” field or “CommonName” field) may be a concatenation of the software component identification, its version number and optionally other identification characters. The method applies equally to other network connected gaming subsystems. The method enables a fine-grained and secure control of the authorized software components and thus the flexibility to securely configure the gaming system in accordance with a schedule or in a close-loop fashion in order to meet business objectives. In addition, a method to enable the certification authority to bind the certificates to the tested code is described.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a divisional of application Ser. No. 10/789,975,filed Feb. 27, 2004, which claims the benefit of Provisional ApplicationNo. 60/453,627, filed Mar. 10, 2003, which applications are herebyincorporated herein by reference in their entireties and from whichpriority is hereby claimed under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119(e) and 120.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present inventions relate generally to the field of networkconnected pay computer-controlled games, either games of skills or gamesof chance, and more particularly to the field of automated monitoringand control of a large number of clusters of pay gaming terminals. Thegaming terminals may be slot machines, video lotteries, bingo systems orlottery terminals in all their forms; that is, desktop terminals, wallor pedestal mounted kiosks, or full size consoles, operating either in alocal area network (LAN) or in a wide area network (WAN). The presentinventions also relate to the monitoring, control and payment systemslinked to the gaming terminals.

2. Description of the Prior Art and Related Information

Pay entertainment and gaming systems of the prior art, either of thecash-in or the cash-less type, are seriously limited due to thetechnical choices made in order to comply with gaming regulatoryrequirements. Regulators are mainly concerned with funds that may beillegally acquired by individuals as well as with funds that may not beacquired by legitimate winners as a result of flaws, cheating and/orstealing. Game regulators are reluctant to accept state-of-the-artoperating systems, multimedia and Internet technologies because ofsecurity concerns and tend to favor antiquated technology based uponsecrecy rather that “open” state-of-the-art technology. A“Request/Authorize” method for downloadable games has been proposed byanother company (IGT's Secure Virtual Network in a Gaming Environment,Publication No. US2002/0116615 A1) but the method disclosed therein doesnot cover how to ensure that only certified authorized components mayexecute.

Although downloadable games are undeniably going to flourish, they haveyet to create confidence within the regulatory arena.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Embodiments of the present invention overcome the security limitationsof the prior art and allow game operators the flexibility to dynamicallyconfigure their estate of gaming terminals. It is to be noted thatalthough the gaming industry has coined the term “downloadable game” andthat gaming standard GLI-21 entitled “Game Download System” has beenpublished by Game Laboratory International (GLI), the term downloadablegame is rather restrictive, as the downloading of software components tocomputer terminals and computer servers is by itself pervasive in anynetwork distributed computer system. However, downloading certified gamecomponents in a secure manner is a problem that has yet to find asatisfactory solution.

Embodiments of the present invention may allocate an individual PKIcertificate to each executable software component and each of itsversions, binding the PKI certificate to the executable software andassociating a distinctive policy for each PKI certificate. The PKIcertificate's “Subject Name” (or “Issued to” field, or “CommonName”field) may be a concatenation of the software component identification,its version number and optionally other identification characters, forexample.

According to other embodiments, the present invention offers a method toenable dynamic configuration of gaming terminals installed in one or aplurality of gaming premises whereby certified games, certified datafiles and certified support software components may be activated inaccordance with a predetermined schedule or automatically in response tothe observed gaming activity. This may be accomplished by configuringand then enforcing the software execution policies for selected PKIcertificates in accordance with the desired authorized gameconfiguration and schedule.

Further embodiments of the present invention offer a method to ensurethe trust of non-executable files such as initialization orconfiguration files, video files, sound files, multimedia files, filecontaining list of hashes, CRCs, and/or signatures. This method relieson the certificate Software Restriction Policy as described herein.

Still further embodiments of the invention enable the certificationauthority to bind the certificates to the tested software components.

The present invention, according to still further embodiments thereofenables a dynamic generation of the list of games made available to theplayers without transferring a configuration file or files from thecentral server to the gaming machines. For example, a method accordingto an embodiment of the present invention relies on attempting toexecute a game component on which a certificate Software RestrictionPolicy is enforced.

Embodiments of the present invention leverage the technology describedin commonly assigned application Ser. No. 10/520,831, filed Aug. 12,2005 (which application is hereby incorporated herein by reference inits entirety) in which code signing and Software Restriction Policyenable executing authorized game software. Code signing and SoftwareRestriction Policy (SRP) technologies are available in Microsoft WindowsXP, Windows 2000 and Windows 2003, Embedded Windows XP as well as infuture Windows versions (as of this writing, the next version iscode-named “Longhorn”) to ensure that only executable softwarecomponents from a trusted publisher, let's say “Microsoft”, are allowedto run. Code signing and Software Restriction Policy technology areapplied to executable components such as *.exe, *.dll, *.ocx, *.vbs,*.msi, *.cab, etc. In addition, Software Installation Policy (SIP)ensures that software components are installed in a controlled fashion.Embodiments of the present invention extend the use of code signing,Software Restriction Policy and Software Installation Policy toindividual software components that are allowed to execute in a networkconnected gaming system by associating a distinctive code-signingcertificate to each executable software component. Each executablesoftware component version (usually comprising major version, minorversion, revision and build) may have a unique certificate. Adistinctive certificate may be created for each software componentversion and the two entities (the compiled code and the certificate) maybe bound together by a code signing operation, herein called“signcode.exe.”

Code signed software components may be packaged together with non-signedsoftware components (if any) into a MSI Microsoft installation package(MSI=Microsoft Software Installation). An MSI package is an executablecomponent that in turn receives a distinctive certificate bound to itscontent by a code signing operation. Only the software component versionthat has successfully passed the regulatory certification process may beallowed to run by enforcing an unrestricted policy to the associatedcertificate.

Moreover, embodiments of the present invention extend the use of codesigning and Software Restriction Policy to ensure that only authorizednon-executable components are used by the authorized executablecomponents. This is of particular value for configuration files or mediafiles that may affect the game outcome such as fixing the return toplayer at, for example, 95% between 5:00 PM and 11:00 PM, or at 98%during other time periods. For this, non-executable components may beplaced in code signed MSI (Microsoft Software Installation) installationpackages. Each individual MSI package is an executable component whoseexecution can be controlled by Software Restriction Policy (SRP). Adistinctive certificate may be created for each package version (a partnumber is created for a preselected aggregate of non-executablecomponents) and the two entities may be bound together by the codesigning operation “signcode.exe.” Within the network connected gamingsystem, trust for non-executable components may be established byexecuting the associated authorized code signed packages using SRP uponcomputer startup or alternatively on demand, resulting in there-installation of the original non-corrupted non-executable components.The non-executable components may be: initialization or configurationfiles, video files, sound files, multimedia files, file containing listof hashes, CRCs, and/or signatures, for example.

For example, DRM (Digital Rights Management) technology offered byMicrosoft Windows Media Player may be used to ensure that onlyauthorized multimedia files may be played or viewed.

Also, RM (Rights Management) technology offered with Microsoft Office2003, with the associated RM services and SDK (Software Development Kit)may be used to ensure that only authorized data files may be accessed,viewed, copied or modified.

Software Installation Policy (SIP) and Software Restriction Policy (SRP)configured with an individual PKI certificate associated to eachauthorized software component offer a “Policy/Enforce” model, or inother words a “Configure the Policy and then Enforce the Policy” modelto enable network installation (or “game download”) and activation atpredetermined times (or “game scheduling”) of selected authorizedsoftware components, in order to control the software of the networkconnected gaming system and offer selected games to players. This“Policy/Enforce” method may be constructed on a demonstrable trustedbase; it offers transparent security and fine-grained auditing,contrasting with conventional “Request/Authorize” methods that do notdemonstrate reliance on a trusted base to enforce the use of onlytrusted software components.

A network-connected gaming system comprises hundreds of authorizedcertified software components that may be selectively downloaded andscheduled. Considering on-going support for 50 customers and for 200distinctive games over a period of 5 years, tens of thousands ofsoftware components will each need to receive individual certificatesand be certified. Accordingly, embodiments of the present inventioninclude an automated certification platform. Herein, such acertification platform is denoted “Integrated Certification Environment”or ICE. Embodiments of such a certification platform according to thepresent invention are designed to automate the stepping through theprocedure that must be done by the regulatory certification authority toproduce only authorized software components that may be dynamicallyinstalled in a gaming system, and to prevent generation of erroneoussoftware components. In addition, the ICE offers support to selectivelyenable the download of approved system software components usingMicrosoft Software Update Services (SUS), for example.

Embodiments of the present methods rely on established securitystandards and a demonstrable trusted base (as opposed to relying onsecurity by secrecy) in order to offer transparent security and allowfine-grained auditing. Embodiments of the present inventions are alsoapplicable to any of the subsystems available in a network connectedgaming system that require preventing non-authorized software componentsfrom executing or affecting the game outcome, such as the gamingterminals, the game management system (CMS or MCS) that monitor andcontrol whole or part of the estate of gaming machines, the progressivejackpot systems, the bonussing systems as well as game paymentverification systems such as IGT's EasyPay and Cyberview's PVU (PaymentVerification Unit) and PVS (Payment Verification System). Gamingsubsystems may be tested against gaming standards such as those producedby GLI; the game standards are mandated by game regulators in accordancewith local regulation and laws. The network-connected subsystems may belocated within the premises accommodating the estate of gaming machine(connection via a LAN) or outside of the premises (connection via aWAN).

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates the intrinsic information that uniquely identifieseach executable software component, according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 2 illustrates the information uniquely identifying each executablesoftware component being made available into the Windows Event Log uponexecution of the software component, according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 3 illustrates the information (test certificate indicator,project/product code, type of executable code, part number,major/minor/build/version, certification lab identifier, friendly name)uniquely identifying each executable software component being used togenerate the “Subject Name” (or “Issued to” field, or “CommonName”field) of the individual PKI certificate associated to each executablesoftware component, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 illustrates the information that may be entered in the ExtendedAttributes of a PKI certificate, according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 5 illustrates the information that may be obtained using theTrusted Inventory tool, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 6 illustrates the information that may be entered to configure atype-certificate Software Restriction Policy rule, according to anembodiment of the present invention. A Software Restriction Policy (SRP)is configured using the Group Policy Object Editor.

FIG. 7 illustrates the policies that are associated to the activedirectory container used to configure the gaming machines, according toan embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary cycle from the moment a game is beingcreated until it is first executed on a gaming terminal, according to anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 9 illustrates the global verification process performed by theterminal in order to check that no unauthorized file may execute or mayaffect game outcome, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 10 illustrates the configuration of the three parties involved in anew game cycle detailed at FIG. 8, according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 11 illustrates the 12 folders created on the disk repository of thedevelopment environment, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 12 illustrates the dataflow for step 1 to step 3 for producing thecertified authorized software components, according to an embodiment ofthe present invention.

FIG. 13 illustrates the dataflow for step 4 to step 12 for producing thecertified authorized software components, according to an embodiment ofthe present invention.

FIG. 14 illustrates the grouping of gaming terminals and the associatedenforced policies, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 15 illustrates a method for enforcing a Software InstallationPolicy by “linking” the policy, according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 16 illustrates a method for enforcing a Software Restriction Policyby “linking” the policy, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 17 illustrates the method to enforce a policy at a predeterminedtime, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 18 illustrates the method to enforce a selected policy as theresult of observing the gaming activity, according to an embodiment ofthe present invention.

FIG. 19 illustrates the method to generate dynamically the menu list ofauthorized game made available to the player on each gaming terminal,according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 20 illustrates the method to generate a code signed companionsoftware component, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 21 illustrates the method to quickly generate dynamically the listof game installed on each gaming terminal using the companion softwarecomponent, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Reference will now be made in detail to the construction and operationof preferred implementations of the present invention illustrated in theaccompanying drawings. The following description of the preferredimplementations of the present invention is only exemplary of theinvention. The present invention is not limited to theseimplementations, but may be realized by other implementations.

FIG. 1 illustrates Software Component Identification and Traceabilityvia File Properties, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention. Shown at 100 in FIG. 1 is the intrinsic information thatuniquely identifies each executable software component. The executablecomponent source code comprises executable code lines (e.g. X=X+1; notshown here) and associated source code assembly information 102, 104that comprises comment lines 106 and assembly information. Herein,AssemblyTitle 108, AssemblyProduct 110 and AssemblyVersion 112 areconfigured. The AssemblyTitle 108 is set to CyberInv.exe that is thefriendly name of the executable software component; AssemblyProduct 110is set to 0006-00001-00 that is the part number of the executablesoftware component and AssemblyVersion 112 is set to 1.0.1.0, which isthe version number of the executable software component. Once the sourcecode is compiled and the executable is built (CyberInv.exe in thiscase), the configured assembly information is available via the FileProperty of Windows 114 when right clicking on the file CyberInv.exe andselecting “Properties” and “Version”, as shown at 116. The friendly nameis shown in the Description field 118, the part number is shown in theProduct Name field 120, 122 and the version is shown in the File Versionfield 124.

It will be apparent to those of skill in the art of software developmentthat intrinsic information that uniquely identifies each executablesoftware component may be obtained in various combinations of assemblydirectives and file property fields. Additional information may beconfigured such as, for example, the software component part number,major version number, minor version number, build number, revisionnumber, project name, type of software component, language variant, gameregulation variant, friendly name, identification of the certificationlaboratory, identification of the client, and other predeterminedidentification identifiers. The identifiers associated with theexecutable software component using source code assembly directives may,therefore, be traceable via the File Property features of the Windowsoperating system.

An example of such a configuration isCST3000-0006-00001-00[1.0.1.0]{21}̂11˜9%S CyberInv.exe that comprises aconcatenation of identifiers that may be used in a file name or a PKIcertificate subject name. According to this example, CST3000 is themarketing system product identification or the project name;0006-00001-00 is the software component part number; [1.0.1.0] detailsthe software component major version number, minor version number, buildnumber, revision number; {21} is the software component variantidentifier; ̂11 identifies the certification lab that certifies thesoftware component; ˜9 identifies the customer for which this softwarecomponent is certified; %S is the software component language variant(“S” for Spanish in this example); CyberInv.exe is the softwarecomponent friendly name for quick identification. Spaces may be usedfreely and the identifier fields may be written in any order so as tofacilitate reading. Identifier fields may be omitted whenever thecontext already provides such information. The framing or delimitercharacters such as [ ], { }, ˜, ̂, % which are allowable characters tobe used in file names and certificate subject names facilitate humanrecognition as well as string searches for particular attributes (globalsearch for all Spanish variants for example).

In the same manner, a selected set of identification information makingup the certificate subject name may be used for making up the file nameof PKI certificate related files such as *.CER, *.P7B and *.PVK such asto facilitate human identification, string searches and file searches.

FIG. 2 illustrates traceability via the Windows Event Log. Referencenumeral 200 in FIG. 2 illustrates the information uniquely identifyingeach executable software component being made available to the WindowsEvent Log upon execution of the software component. The Windows EventLog 202 is a repository for logging important events; it is viewed viathe Event Viewer 204. Windows default event log bins (or containers) areApplication, Security and System. In the illustrated example, an EventLog bin 206 denominated “Cyberscan” has been added. The Cyberscan bin206 contains traceability information in its “Source” field that isbeing logged by each of the executable software components. The softwareexecutable software component makes use of the Event Log API to “splash”its identification information into the source field of a predeterminedbin in the Windows Event Log each time it starts execution, or at anyother time should the occurrence of an event be traced, in order toprovide an audit trail to be examined by auditors. The part number 214,version 216 and friendly name 212 identifiers associated to theexecutable software component using source code assembly directives 201are therefore traceable via the Event Log features of the Windowsoperating system. Other information associated with the executablesoftware component may be splashed into the event log for additionaltraceability. The “Type” field 208 may flag an important audit conditionsuch as here “Failure Audit” to alert the auditor.

FIG. 3 illustrates the Certificate “Issued to” Field. Reference numeral300 illustrates the information 308 (test certificate indicator 318,project/product code 320, type of executable code 322, part number 324,major/minor/build/version 326, certification lab identifier 328,friendly name 330) uniquely identifying each executable softwarecomponent being used to generate the “Subject Name” 316 (or “Issued to”field 306, 314, or also known as the “CommonName” field) of theindividual PKI certificate 304 associated with each executable softwarecomponent, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Thefriendly name, part number and version of the executable softwarecomponents may be substantially identical to those entered in the sourcecode assembly 302. “Subject Name” 316 and “Issued to” field 306, 314refer to the same information; Subject Name is preferably usedhereafter. The certificate authority 312 responsible for generating thePKI certificate is shown in the “Issued by” field 310.

FIG. 4 at 400 illustrates the information that may be entered in theExtended Attributes 408 of a PKI certificate 402, according to anembodiment of the present invention. This information may be viewed byselecting, for example, the “Details” tab 404 of the certificate 402 andselecting “Extensions Only”, as shown at 406. Intrinsic information thatuniquely identifies each executable software component may be entered inthe extended attributes of a PKI certificate in order to attain the samepurpose as described for FIG. 3 as an alternative to entering theinformation in the certificate Subject Name. In the same manner,additional identification information to those entered in the SubjectName may be entered in the extended attributes.

FIG. 5 illustrates traceability via the Trusted Inventory Tool 504,according to an embodiment of the present invention. Reference numeral500 in FIG. 5 illustrates the information that may be obtained using theTrusted Inventory tool 504. The trusted inventory tool 504 is a simpleapplication that searches for executable files through the branches of agiven tree directory and determines whether the executable softwarecomponent may be trusted by, for example, calling the MicrosoftChkTrust.exe tool. If the executable software component is signed by avalid PKI certificate and its executable binary data is uncorrupted (itsrecalculated hash matches the code signature), the ChkTrust.exe toolreturns the authenticode “Trusted” attribute; an “Untrusted” attributeis returned otherwise. The Trusted attributes are automaticallytabulated in a spreadsheet such as, for example, Microsoft Excel asdepicted at 506. Each line 508 in the table provides details on theexecutable software component that is being examined, such as programpath location 510, friendly name 512, executable type 514, authenticodetrusted attribute 516, part number 518 and version 520. According to anembodiment of the present invention, therefore, the part number 518,version 520 and friendly name 512 514 identifiers associated with theexecutable software component using source code assembly directives 502are traceable via the Trusted Inventory tool.

Reference numeral 600 in FIG. 6 illustrates the information that may beentered to configure a type-certificate Software Restriction Policyrule. A Software Restriction Policy (SRP) 604 may be configured usingthe Group Policy Object Editor 606. The type-certificate SoftwareRestriction Policy rule 610 may be entered in the “Additional Rules”node 608 of the Software Restriction Policy object 614. In FIG. 6, thepart number, version and friendly name configured in the source codeassembly 602 are recognizable in the certificate subject name 612.

FIG. 7 illustrates SRP Certificate Rules Policies via the Group PolicyManagement Console, according to an embodiment of the present invention.Reference numeral 700 in FIG. 7 illustrates the policies that areassociated to the active directory container used to configure thegaming machines referenced at 706. Policies are managed using the GroupPolicy Management Console 702, 704. In this illustration, a policy named“SRP_CyberInv” 708, 710, 712 is selected, for the purpose of viewing adetailed report of the rules that are configured. The report showsdetails in a hierarchical order. This exemplary policy defines only onecertificate rule 716 in the Software Restriction Policy node 714. Thecertificate subject name 718 is set with a security level 720 of“Unrestricted”, as shown at 722, thus ensuring that only the executablesoftware component identified in the certificate subject name isauthorized to execute when the policy 714 is enforced. The SRP pathrules 724 must be configured such as to prevent non-authorized softwarefrom executing. The policy 708 is enforced when it is linked to itscontainer object 706 herein named “Gaming Machines.”

Reference numeral 800 in FIG. 8 illustrates an exemplary cycle from themoment a game is being created until it is first executed on a gamingterminal, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Theflowchart 800 starts at 802 when the decision to initiate a project todevelop and release a new game is made. The game developer (Cyberscanhere, for illustrative purposes only) 804 develops a new gameapplication 806 whose code must be certified at 810 by a recognizedcertification lab 808. The certified code must then be signed as shownat 812 using PKI certificates produced by a certificate issuingauthority (CA) 814 controlled by a trusted party 816. The trusted party816 may be the certification lab 808. The signed executable softwarecomponents may be packaged in code-signed MSI installation packagessigned in a manner substantially identical to the executable softwarecomponents, that is, with a unique PKI certificate whose subject namecontains part number, version and friendly name identifiers for the MSIpackage. The MSI packages together with scripts may then be copied to aremovable media, such as a CD-ROM 818 for example.

The game operator 820 receives the CD-ROM and when it decides to deploythe new game 822, it copies the packages and associated scripts from theremovable media into a library repository on a server 824 (the DEPLOYserver in this case). The scripts contain automation tasks such ascopying to the repository and configuring the policies.

In the case of gaming terminals connected in a LAN, each gaming terminal826 is controlled by the policies as soon as they are enforced. TheSoftware Installation Policies (SIPs) controlling the installation ofthe new game automatically execute the MSI installation packages uponpolicy enforcement, provided the corresponding Software RestrictionPolicies have been configured to authorize the execution of the MSIinstallation packages. This process is performed at 828, 830. If no SRPauthorizes the execution of the MSI installation packages, theinstallation is ignored, as shown at 832. When the MSI installationpackage is authorized to execute, the software components and otherfiles contained in the package may be copied to the gaming terminals, assuggested at reference numeral 834 836. Other configuration tasks mayalso be carried out during the Microsoft installer installation processsuch as, for example, setting the Windows registry, setting shortcutsand installing software patches.

Download of the game software components from the game repository to thegaming terminals may occur as soon as the associated SoftwareInstallation Policies are enforced (and the SRPs for the MSIinstallation package is permitted accordingly). Therefore, scheduling ofthe download may be achieved by simply enforcing the associated softwareinstallation policies at a given time; this may be accomplished byhaving an operator manually enforcing the SIP at a predetermined timevia the group policy management console, or having a processautomatically enforcing the SIP at a predetermined time via the API tothe group policy management console. Enforcing a policy may be achievedby linking the selected policy to the selected policy object in thedomain controller active directory.

Game activation 840 that authorizes execution of the game may beachieved by enforcing the associated Software Restriction Policies. Inthe same manner, scheduled game activation and deactivation in order tooffer selected authorized games to the players at predeterminedauthorized times may be achieved by simply enforcing the associatedSoftware Restriction Policies at a given time; this may be accomplishedby having an operator manually enforce the SRP at a predetermined timevia the group policy management console, or having a processautomatically enforce the SRP at a predetermined time via the API to thegroup policy management console. Enforcing a policy may be achieved bylinking the selected policy to the selected policy object in the domaincontroller active directory. Alternatively, a selected executablesoftware component may be prevented from executing by configuring itsassociated SRP security level to “disallowed.”

At this stage, a global verification process 842, 844 as describedrelative to FIG. 9 may advantageously be executed to verify the trust ofevery software component installed on the gaming terminal. Should theglobal verification fail, the gaming terminal may be locked at 846pending servicing by an attendant.

When a player selects a game from a gaming terminal 838 from a selectionmenu and requests execution thereof, as shown at 848, the authenticodesof the game's executable software components are verified by theassociated enforced Software Restriction Policy as shown at 850 beforebeginning execution 858. Should the authenticode verification fail at852, the gaming terminal may be locked at 854 pending servicing by anattendant. If the code is trusted, as verified by the associatedenforced SRP, the game is allowed to execute, as shown at 858.

Policy changes are automatically distributed by the Windows serveroperating system throughout the network connected gaming system atperiodic intervals; this automatic process may be disabled if required.Alternatively, the RegisterGPNotification function may be used by thegame application software executing on each gaming terminal to check ifan applicable group policy has changed. The gaming terminal may thendecide on enforcing the policies locally immediately. The gpupdate.exeservice, the RefreshPolicy function or the RefreshPolicyEx function maybe used by the game application software executing on each gamingterminal to enforce the configured policies. A reboot may optionally beperformed in order to recheck the gaming terminal trusted base andensure the policies have been completely enforced (long gameinstallation for example).

The RegisterGPNotification function enables an application to receivenotification when there is a change in policy. When a policy changeoccurs, the specified event object is set to the signaled state. Furtherinformation on the RegisterGPNotification function may be found at:http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/policy/-registergpnotification.asp.The RefreshPolicy function causes policy to be applied immediately onthe client computer. Further information on the RefreshPolicy functionmay be found at:http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/policy/-refreshpolicy.asp.The RefreshPolicyEx function causes policy to be applied immediately onthe computer. The extended function allows specifying the type of policyrefresh to apply to be specified. Further information on theRefreshPolicyEx may be found athttp://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/policy/refreshpolicyex.asp.

The menu of authorized games offered to the player may be dynamicallygenerated by each terminal without requiring the central system todispatch the list of authorized games or having each terminal fetch thelist of authorized games from the central system; this may be done byhaving each terminal check the policies enforced on the games. This maybe accomplished by having a process in each terminal attempt to executeeach of the entry point for each game (the parent module which is firstcalled upon selecting a game to play). If the execution succeeds, thenthe game is authorized and may be added to the games menu offered to theplayer. If the execution is denied (SRP is unlinked or the securitylevel is disallowed), then the game is not authorized and it is removedfrom the games menu offered to the player. Similarly, if a game entrysoftware component file is not found, then the software is not installedor has been removed and is removed from the games menu offered to theplayer. The process of dynamically generating the game selection menumay be optimized in many ways in order to reduce the game time to startoverhead to check if it is authorized.

In a casino, although new games may be scheduled to be downloaded togaming terminals and activated at predetermined times, it is arequirement that games may not be changed while a player is playing. Inpractical terms, a player is considered to have terminated his or hergame play when the player's credit balance remains at zero for apredetermined period of time. The predetermined period time issufficient for allowing the player to enter a new bill or other form ofcredit instrument to continue playing. Therefore, the game applicationsoftware on each game terminal may, according to embodiments of thepresent invention, continually test for this condition (credit=0 for apredetermined time) before checking for change in policy, enforcing thepolicy changes and then updating the menu of games to be made availableto the next player.

FIG. 9 at 900 illustrates the global verification process performed by aterminal to check that no unauthorized files are allowed to execute oraffect the game outcome. This process may be performed by any of thesubsystems connected in the gaming systems.

The process may start with a computer cold or hot reboot 902 such thatthe operating system trusted base may be thoroughly verified before thegame software components are verified. The trusted base is detailed incommonly assigned and copending application Ser. No. 10/520,831, filedAug. 12, 2005, and also in Microsoft Next Generation Secure ComputingBase (NGSCB), also incorporated herein by reference. Details ofMicrosoft's NGSCB are located at www.microsoft.com/ngscb. During thetrusted base verification, the integrity of the Driver Signingframework, the Windows File Protection framework and SoftwareRestriction Policies framework are verified. With NGSCB operating systemsuch as forthcoming “Longhorn,” a framework called Nexus deeplyintegrated directly within the hardware components (in each majorchipsets) and the BIOS which constitutes a mechanism for authenticatingthe trustworthiness of the software and hardware configuration, isbooted prior to checking the integrity of the Driver Signing framework,the Windows File Protection framework and Software Restriction Policiesframework.

On completion of the operating system boot-up 902 or at another time,the global verification process 904 may be executed. The CyberInvprocess 910, 914 is also shown and described at FIG. 5. The CyberInvprocess 910, 914 verifies all the executable files in given folder treessuch as 912 (*.exe, *.dll, *.ocx, *.vbs, *.bat, *.msi, *.cab, forexample) for trustworthiness. If any file is found to be untrusted asshown at 932, then the gaming terminal may be frozen as shown at 934pending examination by security personnel. A spreadsheet file 916 may beproduced that list the verification status of each executable file. Ifthe authenticode of all the files is trusted as shown at 918 then theCyberInv process 908, 910, 914, 924 returns at 920 a trusted status, asshown at 926 930. Consequently, all of the executable softwarecomponents may be considered to be trusted, as shown at 930.

However, it is to be noted that the fact that an executable softwarecomponent is trusted does not imply that the software component isauthorized to execute; it merely indicates that the software executablesoftware component has a valid authorized authenticode certificate andthat the software component binary data is not corrupted. Checkingwhether an executable software component having a valid authorizedauthenticode certificate is authorized to execute requires that theapplicable Software Restriction Policy be checked. This may be performedautomatically when the software component is loaded by the operatingsystem to start its execution, either when dynamically building the menuof authorized games, or each time upon starting execution of the gamewhen the player has selected a game to play—or using an appropriateservice that may be called by an application.

Although RM (Rights Management) and DRM (Digital Rights Management)technology from Microsoft is readily available for authenticating thetrustworthiness of non-executable files such as media files, Word filesand emails, for example, it adds management complexity on top of theSoftware Restriction Policy framework when used in a network-connectedgaming system. Addressing this, embodiments of the present inventionoffer a method for a network connected gaming system to trustnon-executable files such as initialization or configuration files,video files, sound files, multimedia files, file containing list ofhashes, CRCs, and/or signatures. The present method relies on packagingthe non-executable files in a MSI installation package, the MSI packagebeing subsequently code-signed with a unique certificate and theappropriate Software Restriction Policy is configured to enableinstallation (execution in fact) of this MSI package. Executable filesand non-executable files may be packaged together for convenience. Theselected aggregate of executable files and non-executable receives atleast a part number (and preferably a version number as well) that isused in the subject name of the associated certificate. Consequently,according to embodiments of the present invention, when the MSI packageis installed, the installed non-executable files are obtained from atrusted and authorized source.

As the CyberInv process 908 has authenticated the trustworthiness of allthe *.msi files 911, therefore whenever there is a need to ensure thatthe non-executable files are trusted, the associated MSI package isre-installed. It is to be noted that the service that performs theinstallation of the MSI packages (msiexec.exe in the current versions ofWindows) may be executed with a variety of execution modifiers, such asshown athttp://www.microsoft.com/tech-net/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/proddocs/msiexec.asp.Of particular interest is the c option that reinstalls a file if it ismissing or if the stored checksum of the installed file does not matchthe new file's value (the log file will contain the anomalies detectedfor subsequent forensic analysis), as shown at 936. In the globalverification process 904, the c option of the msiexec.exec command maybe used for re-installing every package containing configuration files938 (such as initialization or configuration files, files containinglist of hashes, CRCs, and/or signatures), Flash files 940 (MacromediaFlash and Director), and other media assets files 942 in order to ensurethe trustworthiness of these files.

Subsequent to completion of process 908, all the MSI packages for theexecutable software components may be re-installed with for example, themsiexec.exe command using the p option in order to re-install missingauthorized executable software components (the log file will contain theanomalies detected for subsequent forensic analysis).

Subsequent to the successful completion of the global verificationprocess 904, the trustworthiness of the game application framework isestablished and may be started, as shown at 906.

It is to be noted that when a player wins an amount equal to or greaterthan $25,000 in a casino, there is a requirement to check the integrityof the gaming application. With legacy gaming terminals, the gamingterminal is powered-down and the ROMs are extracted in order to beverified in a trusted verifier named a “Kobetron.” The Kobetron producesa signature for each of the ROMs that is compared with the correspondingsignature produced by the certification lab. In this manner, theintegrity of the all the software components of the legacy gamingterminal, including the operating system, the game application and theconfiguration data may be verified. According to embodiments of theinvention, when executing the global verification process 904 subsequentto the gaming terminal bootup at 902, a verification equivalent to“Kobetron verification” may be performed. This metaphor helps greatly inthe acceptability of downloadable game technology by game regulators whoare reluctant to accept state-of-the-art operating systems, multimediaand network technologies.

FIG. 10 at 1000 illustrates the configuration of the three partiesinvolved in a new game cycle detailed at FIG. 8, according to anembodiment of the present invention. The three parties involved in agame cycle, according to embodiments of the present invention, are thegame developer 1002 whose facilities are located in a given city 1004,the certification laboratory 1006 whose facilities are located in agiven city 1008 and the gaming operator 1010 located in a given city1012. The game developer 1002 and the certification lab 1006 may have anetwork 1020 of connected gaming system(s) representative of the networkconnected gaming system in place at the location (e.g., the casino) ofthe gaming operator 1010. In addition, the game developer 1010 and thecertification lab 1006 each may have an integrated software developmentenvironment for compiling the game applications source code, eachcapable of managing at least 200 games for 50 distinct game operators asshown at 1044, (resulting in thousands of source code variants due tolocal regulation variances). The development environments may be keptsynchronized via the secure network link 1016, 1018, 1014, 1022, 1020. Acertification authority (CA) 1040 may be located at the game developer'ssite or may be controlled by an authorized trusted party such asVeriSign. The game developer site and the certification lab site may beaccessible from the outside by authorized mobile users 1034, 1028 viasecure links 1022, 1018, 1030, and 1036. Logon authentication may becarried out using, for example, smartcards as shown at 1038, 1032 or byother secure means.

The game developer 1002 supplies the certification lab 1006 with aCD-ROM (or other media) containing the software components to be tested,as shown at 1048. The certification lab then certifies the softwarecomponents supplied on the CD-ROM and provides the game developer 1002with a CD-ROM containing the certified software components fordeployment, as shown at 1046. The CD-ROM 1046 containing the authorizedsoftware components that were tested and certified by the certificationlab 1006 may then be provided to the game operator (e.g., the casino)for installation and deployment on one or more of the gaming machinesGM001, GM002, GM2995 coupled to the network 1024. The certifiedauthorized software components are code-signed using a certificateproduced in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, asdescribed hereinabove. The network 1024 is preferably not coupled to anyexternal network, as suggested at 1026.

FIG. 11 shows a 12-Step Integrated Certification Environment Process,according to an embodiment of the present invention. Shown at 1100 arethe 12 folders 1110 created on the disk repository 1102 of thedevelopment environment. The 12 folders 1110 are mapped to the 12-stepprocedure 1104 to 1106 involved in producing the CD-ROM 1050 containingthe certified authorized software components. Each folder contains thecomputer resources and instructions to carry out each step. The foldersare clearly named with the step number and the title description of theprocedure step at 1108.

FIG. 12 shows a dataflow diagram of Step #1 to Step #3 of the IntegratedCertification Environment Processor for producing certified authorizedsoftware components, according to an embodiment of the presentinvention. Step 1 at 1220 may include obtaining a snapshot 1212 of therepository 1204 containing the game developer's source code 1206, datafiles 1208 and media assets 1210 in order to configure the buildingenvironment of the reference platform with all the source code, datafiles, media asset files and resources files required to initiate thecertification process. The snapshoot files 1212 may be stored in arepository 1218 controlled by a version configuration and control system(SCCS) such as Microsoft Visual Source Safe 1214 (VSS) on the DEVdevelopment computer 1216. The files may be grouped in projectdirectories as “Projects” such that the source files, control files andresource files are stored in convenient systematic fashion in the VisualStudio repository 1240 on the development computer 1238. An inventory ofthe files submitted for certification may be produced. Step 1 may bequalified as “SETUP Projects” 1222.

Step 2 at 1232 may include compiling the source code and producingbinary executable code. Microsoft Visual Studio 1224 is constructed soas to manage source code as projects (a project can be a given game)regrouping all of the dependent source code, and data files. Step 2 isalso referenced as building the projects or “BUILD Projects,” as shownat 1234. Media assets may require a different compiling environment onthe DEV computer 1230 such as the Macromedia Director 1228.

Step 3, shown at 1242 may include producing the projects MSI packages1244 for the source code compiled in Step 2. Relevant non-executablefile such as configuration files and media assets may be packaged in MSIpackages with the compiled source code. It is to be noted 1246 thatpackages will be built again (step 8 hereafter) after code signing ofEXE, DLL, OCX and other executables (step 6 hereafter). Step 3 may bereferenced as “BUILD Packages Pass #1” 1244.

FIG. 13 shows, at 1300, the dataflow for step 4 to step 12 for producingthe certified authorized software components, according to an embodimentof the present invention. Step 4 at 1308 calls for the CyberInv.exeprocess 1306, for a selected project (a Visual Studio project maytypically regroup all the software components for an entire game),perform an inventory 1304 of the compiled software components producedby Visual Studio 1302 on completion of the Build Project process 1234(FIG. 12) as well as the MSI install packages produced by the Build MSIPackages Pass #1 1244 process (FIG. 12). The CyberInv.exe 1306 processmay also include any other executable software components not directlymanaged under Visual Studio such as, for example, ocx, *.vbs, *.bat,*.cab, *js. (in fact, any executable component that is supported by theSoftware Restriction Policy technology).

The CyberInv.exe process 1306 produces the CyberInv.xls 1307 Excelspreadsheet file 916 shown at FIG. 9, which is examined by an authorizeduser in the MS Excel program 1310. The CyberInv.xls 1307 file is copiedto the folder “Step 4—CyberInv” folder in 1110 in FIG. 11. The binaryfiles having just been compiled are not code-signed; consequently theauthenticode field shows an “Untrusted” status for each of the binarycomponents. The friendly name, file type, part number and version(including build number) are extracted directly from the assemblyinformation contained in the source code, therefore truly reflecting theidentity of the source code component.

Because the build number is incremented each time the code is recompiledin a Build operation, it is to be noted that the version number willchange accordingly. The authorized user eliminates the rows that areirrelevant to the game to be certified and saves the file under theCyberCert.xls 1311 file name which contains the necessary friendly name512, executable type 514, part number 518 and version 520 information tocompose the PKI certificate subject name in accordance with methoddetailed at FIG. 3 for subsequent code signing. The program pathlocation 510 of the unsigned software components is also available forlater retrieval of the unsigned binary file. The CyberCert.xls 1311 fileis copied to the folder “Step 5—CyberCert” folder in 1110 in FIG. 11.

The CyberCert.xls 1311 file may be securely copied in encrypted form toa removable media such as a floppy disk, a CD-ROM or a USB disk 1312, oralternatively transferred to another location by secure communicationmeans.

The CyberCert.xls 1311 file is split into 2 files CyberSign1.xls 1317and CyberSign2.xls 1319. CyberSign2.xls contains only the rowsassociated to the MSI packages and CyberSign1.xls contains the rowscorresponding to the other executable file. CyberSign1.xls is copied tothe “Step 6—CyberSign (Pass #1)” folder in 1110 in FIG. 11, andCyberSign2.xls is copied to the “Step 8—CyberSign (Pass #2)” folder.

Step 5 at 1316 includes having a certification authority (CA) 1315located at the game developers' site or controlled by an authorizedtrusted party such as VeriSign generating certificates in accordancewith the details provided in the CyberCert.xls 1311 file, that is, witha subject name created in accordance with the method detailed relativeto FIG. 3. An automated process CyberCert.exe 1318 executing on theoff-line CA computer Windows server named CS11 1314 may automate thegeneration of the PKI public certificates 1326 and the associatedprivate keys 1328 using the CyberCert.xls 1311 file.

The trusted root certificate for the authorized CA 1320 is supplied tothe certification lab, the game regulators or other parties forreference and for importing as a trusted root into the ICE computersystem and the gaming system certificates store.

The public certificates 1326 and their associated private keys 1328 areforwarded to the DEV computer 1332 of the ICE system in encrypted formon a removable media such as a floppy disk, a CD-ROM or a USB disk 1324,or alternatively transferred by secure communication means. Publiccertificates 1326 and their associated private keys 1328 that areassociated with the MSI packages are copied into the “Step 6—CyberSign(Pass #1)” folder in 1110, and the other public certificates 1326 andtheir associated private keys 1328 that are associated with othersoftware components are copied to the “Step 8—CyberSign (Pass #2)”folder.

Step 6 1336 includes steps of code signing the non-MSI executablecomponents listed in the CyberSign1.xls 1317 file using thecorresponding public certificates 1326 and their private keys 1328. Thecode signing may be performed using the SignCode.exe utility provided byMicrosoft, or equivalent. A password may be required for the private keydepending on the security option selected when generating thecertificate at the CA. The CyberSign.exe process 1330 may automate thecode-signing of all the non-MSI executable components listed in theCyberSign1.xls 1317 file using the friendly name, file type, part numberand version (including build number) given in each row. TheCyberSign.exe process may call the SignCode.exe utility or theequivalent API. During the code signing process, the compiled executablesoftware components may be replaced at 1339 by their code-signed form.Step 6 is designated as “CodeSign Pass#1” 1338.

Step 7 at 1344 includes re-building all the MSI install packages 1345performed during step 3 at 1242. This time, the MSI packages contain thenon-MSI code-signed executable components.

Step 8 at 1340 includes code signing the MSI executable componentslisted in the CyberSign2.xls 1319 file using the corresponding publiccertificates 1326 and their private keys 1328. The code signing may beperformed using the SignCode.exe utility provided by Microsoft, orequivalent. A password may be required for the private key depending onthe security option selected when generating the certificate at the CA.The CyberSign.exe process 1330 may automate the code-signing of all theMSI executable components listed in the CyberSign2.xls 1319 file usingthe friendly name, file type, part number and version (including buildnumber) given in each row. The CyberSign.exe process may call theSignCode.exe utility or the equivalent API. During the code signingprocess, the executable MSI software components may be replaced 1341 bytheir code-signed form. Step 8 is designated as “CodeSign Pass#2” at1342. The executable MSI software components are copied as shown at 1371to the CD Pre-Burn repository 1372.

Because of the necessity of performing step 7, the CyberSign 1330code-signing process to be used for the ICE (Integrated CertificationEnvironment) is designated a “2-Pass code-sign”, as indicated at 1334.

Step 9 1366 includes (a) configuring the software restriction policy(SRP) 1360 for the ICE system test gaming terminals (via the activedirectory 1350 in the domain controller DC) with the certificate rulescorresponding to the certificate produced at step 5 (the *.p7bcertificate at reference numeral 1326 may be converted to *.certcertificates for compatibility reasons when configuring the SRP); (b)configuring the Software Installation Policy (SIP) 1368 for the ICEsystem test gaming terminals with the MSI packages produced at step 7,then (c) using the GPMC (Group Policy Management Console) or equivalentservice, exporting the SIP via SIP export scripts 1362 and the SRP viaSRP export scripts 1364 (the policy export facility is available in theGroup Policy Management Console GPMC 702, 704). These SIP and SRP exportscripts may be copied into the folder “Step 9—SIP & SRP” folder in 1110.These SIP and SRP export scripts may be later imported in the gamingoperator's 1010 gaming system for enforcing the policies on the gamecomponents. SIP export scripts 1362 and SRP export scripts 1364 arestored in the CD Pre-Burn repository 1372 (or into the folder “Step10—CD Burn—Casino Release” folder in 1110).

Step 10 at 1374 includes steps of burning at 1384 to a CD-ROM 1376 orother removable media the content of the CD Pre-burn repository 1372comprising (a) the executable MSI software components 1371; (b) the SIPexport scripts 5 1362 and SRP export scripts 1364 and (c) otherautomation scripts in order to automate the installation of (a) and (b).A copy of CD-ROM 1376 may be forwarded (a) to the gaming operator's 1010gaming system for game deployment (such as a casino 1379), (b) to thecertification lab 1378, and (c) a trusted party 1377 such as a lawyer orin escrow for impartial reference in case of later dispute. The CD-ROM1376 may later be inserted at 1050 in the gaming operator's 1010 gamingsystem for game deployment.

Step 11 at 1370 includes steps of (a) taking a snap-shot 1387 of theentire development environment for a selected certified game (VisualStudio repository 1302 and Visual Source Safe repository 1214 1218 thatcontains all the source file, the compiled code-signed executable filesand dependant executable files, the non-executable files, projectsolution, automation scripts, the source and compiled signed code fromother development platforms, the media assets from media developmentplatforms such as MacroMedia Director 1228); in (b) taking a snap-shot1387 of the code-signed MSI installation packages; in (c) optionallyencrypting them; and then in (d) copying them into a CD pre-burnrepository 1388 (or into the folder “Step 12—CD Burn—VS Snapshot” folderin 1110).

Step 12 at 1386 includes steps of burning at 1382 to a CD-ROM 1380 orother removable media the content of the CD Pre-burn repository 1388comprising the software components of step 11. A copy of CD-ROM 1380 maybe forwarded to the certification lab 1378 and to a trusted party 1377such as a lawyer or in escrow for impartial reference in case of laterdispute.

Steps 4 to step 12 should be carried out each time a source code isbeing recompiled subsequent to a modification because a uniquecertificate must be associated to each build. Deviating form this ordermay jeopardize certificate integrity because of the risk of a humanerror that may result in the wrong certificate being used during thecode signing process.

FIG. 14 illustrates assignment of policies by banks of gaming machines.Reference numeral 1400 in FIG. 14 shows the grouping of gaming terminaland the associated enforced policies. In this illustration, the GroupPolicy Management console 1402 may be configured such that the activedirectory Organization Unit (OU) named “Gaming Terminals—Floor” at 1404is architectured to regroup the gaming terminals in “banks” orsub-Organization Units (sub-OUs) identified by 200A0 x 1406, 200B0 x1408, 200C0 x 1410, and 200D0 x to 200K0 x at reference numeral 1412.Each bank contains a predetermined number of gaming terminals, inmultiples of 8 units, for example.

Noting the hierarchical tree composed of the OUs and sub-OUs illustratedat 1400, all the policies 1414 apply to the OU “Gaming Terminals—Floor”1414 which contains all the sub-OUs 1406 1408 1410 and 1412. Using thistechnique, all the policies 1414 may apply to all the 3000 gamingterminals of a large casino. In the same manner, the policies 1416, 1418apply to the bank 1406; the policies 1420, 1422 apply to the bank 1408;and the policies 1424, 1426 apply to the bank 1410.

In the illustration, the exemplary game named “Roulette” is assigned apolicy named “Sbm1.5-SIP-Roulette (GLI)” 1416 which configures theSoftware Installation Policy (SIP) and a policy named“Sbm1.5-SRP-Roulette (GLI)” 1418 which configures the SoftwareRestriction Policy (SRP) for that game.

In the same manner, the exemplary game named “Infinity” is assigned apolicy named “Sbm1.4-SRP-Infinity (GLI)” 1424 which configures theSoftware Installation Policy (SIP) and a policy named“Sbm1.4-SRP-Infinity (GLI)” 1426 which configures the SoftwareRestriction Policy (SRP) for that game.

The keyword “Sbm1.4”, in this example, denotes the certificationsubmission number 1.4, and the keyword “GLI” denotes the certificationlab GLI (Game Laboratories International) approving the Infinity gamesoftware.

In the illustration, all of the game terminals regrouped in the bank200A0 x shown at 1406 are, therefore, configured to execute the Roulettegame, all the game terminals in the bank 200B0 x shown at 1408 areconfigured to execute the Roulette game and the Infinity game, and allthe game terminals in the bank 200C0 x shown at 1410 are configured toexecute the Infinity game.

FIG. 15 shows the enforcement of a Software Installation Policy (SIP).In FIG. 14, banks of gaming terminals are configured to executeauthorized games using SIPs and SRPs policies. However, in order for thegaming terminals to be able to install a game, the associated SoftwareInstallation Policy must be enforced. At 1500, FIG. 15 illustrates amethod for enforcing a Software Installation Policy by “linking” thepolicy, according to an embodiment of the present invention. This isaccomplished in the Group Policy Management console 1502 by, e.g.,right-clicking the selected policy 1504, 1506“Sbm3.3-SIP-INFINITY_(—)95” associated to the Infinity game with aReturn To Players (RTP) percentage of 95% and selecting the “linkEnabled” attribute 1514. The software components for the Infinity_(—)95game contained in the two MSI installation packages 1510 and 1512 willsubsequently be installed, provided the associated SRPs are configuredto authorize execution of these two MSI packages (refer to descriptionfor FIG. 16). Alternatively, the same procedure may be automated via anAPI called from an appropriate application. It is to be noted that thelinking of the policy will in fact enable the enforcement of the policy,but the policy will only be enforced on the gaming terminal when agpupdate command or equivalent command is performed at the terminal; aterminal reboot may also be required for the policy to be enforced. Alsoto be noted is that policy changes are automatically distributed by theWindows server operating system throughout the network connected gamingsystem at periodic intervals; this automatic process may preferably bedisabled such as to obtain more predictable policy enforcement changesby issuing explicit commands instead.

Package 1512 (friendly name: Infinity95.msi) contains the executablesoftware components for the Infinity game and package 1510 (friendlyname: Infinity95.Config.msi) contains the configuration files (thenon-executable files) for the Infinity game. PackageInfinity95.Config.msi 1510 is re-installed in the process 938.

FIG. 16 illustrates the enforcement of a Software Restriction Policy(SRP). In FIG. 14, banks of gaming terminals are configured to executeauthorized games using SIPs and SRPs policies. However, in order for thegaming terminals to be able to execute the games, the policies must beenforced. FIG. 16 at 1600 illustrates a method for enforcing a SoftwareRestriction Policy 1608 by “linking” the policy. This is accomplished inthe Group Policy Management console 1602 by, e.g., right-clicking theselected policy 1604, 1606 “Sbm3.3-SRP-INFINITY_(—)95” associated to theInfinity game with a Return To Players percentage (RTP) of 95% andselecting the “link Enabled” attribute 1624.

The certificate rules 1610, 1616 and 1620 that are configured with the“Unrestricted” attribute 1618, 1622 authorize the installation of thesoftware components for the Infinity_(—)95 game contained in the two MSIinstallation packages 1510 and 1512 by authorizing the unique PKIcertificate associated to those MSI produced in accordance with thepresent method. The .“dll” executable software component 1612 isauthorized, has its security level attribute set to “Unrestricted” andis, therefore, authorized to execute once it is installed.

The two MSI installation packages 1510 and 1512 for installing thesoftware components for the Infinity_(—)95 game have their associatedunique PKI certificate 1616 and 1620 (produced in accordance with themethod described herein) configured with the “Unrestricted” securitylevel attribute 1618, 1622 via the certificate rules 1610, thus enabling(or authorizing) execution and installation of the software componentsfor the Infinity_(—)95 game.

The .“dll” executable software component contained in the 1512 packagehas its security level attribute set to “Unrestricted” thus it isauthorized to execute once it is installed.

Alternatively, the same procedure may be automated via an API calledfrom an appropriate application. It is to be noted that the linking ofthe policy will in fact enable the enforcement of the policy, but thepolicy will only be enforced on the gaming terminal when a gpupdatecommand or equivalent command is performed at the terminal; a terminalreboot may also be required for the policy to be enforced. Also to benoted is that policy changes are automatically distributed by theWindows server operating system throughout the network connected gamingsystem at periodic intervals; this automatic process may preferably bedisabled such as to obtain more predictable policy enforcement changesby issuing explicit commands instead.

FIG. 17 illustrates a method at 1700 to enforce a policy at apredetermined time, according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Enabling enforcement of policies as described relative to FIG. 15 andFIG. 16 may be carried out interactively by an authorized user atpredetermined authorized times, or alternatively may be controlled by aprocess at predetermined authorized times via the appropriate API. Atthe central system 1702 (the game download server in this illustration)at a given time 1704, a user or a process may verify a change 1706 inthe list of games to be made available to players on a selected set ofgaming terminal banks. In case of a schedule change as shown at 1710 (orother reasons such as introducing a new game or revoking an existinggame), policies on the domain controller 1714 are being changedaccordingly either interactively by a user in the Group PolicyManagement console as described for FIG. 15 and FIG. 16, or by a processvia the equivalent APIs 1712. The changed policies are being enabled forenforcement at 1716 in the domain controller.

In a casino, although new games may be scheduled to be downloaded togaming terminals and activated at predetermined times, it is arequirement that games are not to be changed while a player is playing.In practical terms, it is considered that a player terminates playingwhen his or her credit balance remains at zero for a predeterminedperiod of time. The predetermined period time should be sufficient toallow the player to enter a new bill or other form of credit or paymentinstrument to continue playing. Therefore, the game application softwareon each game terminal continually tests for this condition (credit=0 fora predetermined period of time) before checking for change in policy,enforcing the policy changes and then updating the menu of games to bemade available to the next player.

Upon power-up, each gaming terminal 1718 executes a boot 1720, loads itsoperating system 1722 and enforces the policies 1724 that are configuredat the time of the start-up process. When the game application starts at1726, it displays a menu of authorized activated games as shown at 1727to the player using for example the dynamic method described relative toFIG. 19. Whenever the player balance is non-zero 1728, 1730, the playermay play as shown at 1732 the games listed on the menu in accordancewith the enforced policies. When the player's balance reaches zero at1734 and remains zero for a predetermined period of time, it isconsidered that the player is no longer playing. The gaming applicationof the gaming terminal may then verify at 1736 if a policy has changed1738. This may be done via the RegisterGPNotification. TheRegisterGPNotification function enables an application to receivenotification when there is a change in policy. When a policy changeoccurs, the specified event object is set to the signaled state.Additional details regarding the RegisterGPNotification function may befound athttp://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/policy/registergpnotification.asp.

At 1740, if there is no change in policy, the games listed on the menuwill be unchanged for the next player. If there is a change in policy at1742, the gaming terminal may enter into a process whereby the policiesare enforced as shown at 1744, using for example the gpupdate.comservice, the RefreshPolicy function or the RefreshPolicyEx function, orequivalent services or API. It is to be noted that the verification ofchange in policy and the enforcement of the changed policies may becarried out by each terminal independently.

The RefreshPolicy function causes policy to be applied immediately onthe client computer. Additional details regarding the RefreshPolicyfunction may be found athttp://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/policy/refreshpolicy.asp

The RefreshPolicyEx function causes policy to be applied immediately onthe computer. The extended function allows specifying the type of policyrefresh to apply. Additional details regarding the RefreshPolicyExfunction may be found athttp://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/policy/policy/refeshpolicyex.asp

Once the change in policy is enforced at 1744, the gaming terminal mayreboot as shown at 1748 or exit and re-enter the gaming application,which would dynamically recreate the menu list of games 1727 to be madeavailable to the next player, as detailed at FIG. 19.

A similar method relying on explicit WMI calls and administrativetemplates (*.adm) may be applied to obtain the same result in gamingenvironments whereby the domain controller active directory is notavailable such is the case with gaming terminals connected in WAN (WideArea Network) whereby the network bandwidth is limited or the networkavailability is poor.

An alternative method relying on SMS (System Management Server) codedownload instead of SIPs (Software Installation Policy) for installingsoftware components and software MSI packages may be used. However, theexecutable software components remains under SRP (Software RestrictionPolicy) in accordance with the unique PKI certificate generated for eachcomponent as described in the invention.

FIG. 18 shows a close-loop enforcement of a policy, according to anembodiment of the present invention. FIG. 18 at 1800 illustrates amethod to enforce a selected policy as the result of observing thegaming activity. The method is directly derived from FIG. 17 whereby thepolicy change 1716 takes place at 1804 and is selected from a choice ofpre-configured policies, for example in a look-up manner, whereby apolicy would result in making available to the players a menu of games1812 (1727 in FIG. 17) to provoke a given gaming activity change whichmay be monitored in real-time at 1816. The observed activity 1818 maythen be compared 1820 to predetermined businesses objectives 1822 and acorrection or modification may be applied by selecting a new policy thatwould change the list of games available on a selected aggregate ofgaming terminals 1810. For example, due to a long queue of people whowant to play the Infinity game, a greater number of banks of gamingterminals may be configured to make the Infinity game available toplayers on these terminals. Another reason for applying a new policymight be if a particular area of the casino floor is heavily populatedwith players while another area is empty. Suppressing some popular gamesin a highly frequented area and adding them to the less frequently areamay help spread the player distribution within the casino or gaming areamore evenly. Yet another reason for applying a new policy could be ifthe gaming activity is low, then games with a higher RTP (return toplayer), let us say 98% instead of 95%, may be activated in some areasto boost activity.

The process may involve several subsystems as illustrated in FIG. 18:the central game control 1802 wherein policies are selected, the domaincontroller 1806 that enables enforcement of the policies 1808, aselection set of gaming terminals 1810 wherein each gaming terminalenforces the policies and make the selected games available to theplayer 1812, a central game monitoring system 1814 that producesactivity reports in real time 1816.

The process shown at 1820 of comparing the observed activity 1818 andthe targeted activity 1822 and then selecting a change in game policies1804 may be carried out by the floor manager or the floor director, oralternatively by a knowledge base process. In both cases, a close-loopenforcement of policies (relying on the unique PKI certificate SRPassociated to each executable authorized and certified softwarecomponent) is achieved resulting in the dynamic configuration of thegaming system, either for LAN configurations (such as casino floors) orWAN configuration (such as video lottery terminals distributed across alarge geographic area).

FIG. 19 at 1900 illustrates a method to generate dynamically the menulist of authorized games made available to the player on each gamingterminal, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Thedynamic configuration of a large gaming system whereby authorized gamesmade available to players on selected group of gaming terminals usingsoftware restrictions policies at the central system may result ishundreds of different game menus. Reliance on SRPs for preventingnon-authorized software components to execute is entirely based on asound and demonstrable trusted base; therefore the gaming system istrusted. Getting the list of authorized games to each gaming terminalwould require configurations files to be sent from the central system toeach of the gaming terminal; however, this would be illegal because thechange in the list of games may affect the game outcome. This is clearlyunderstandable when considering changing a game; let us sayInfinity_(—)95 with a RTP or 95% with Infinity_(—)98 with a RTP of 98%at 10:00 PM, then back at 8:00 AM, and this each day except during theweekend, or at other times as a result of the closed loop processdescribed at FIG. 18. Game regulators mandate that the process to managethis type of change be certified with secure means of the same order aswhen installing/downloading software components using a unique PKImethod.

Embodiments of the present invention, therefore, provide secure means toupdate a list of authorized games to be offered to the player. The menuof authorized games offered to the player may be dynamically generatedby each terminal without requiring the central system to dispatch thelist of authorized games or having each terminal fetch the list ofauthorized games from the central system (both are illegal withoutextreme precaution of the same order as the installing/downloading ofsoftware components using a unique PKI method because they may affectthe game outcome); this is achieved by having each terminal checking thecertificate Software Restriction Policies enforced on the games (aunique PKI certificate being generated for each of the executable gamecomponents in accordance with the methods detailed in this document).

As illustrated in FIG. 19 at 1900, each terminal when executing thegaming application 1902 gets a list of the file names for the gamesavailable at 1904 from a trusted configuration file (an updated trustedconfiguration file may have been downloaded in a certified code signedMSI package with the last game download) and a menu is initiallycompiled for this list. Attempts to execute each of the game entrymodule of the games contained in the list 1906 are made. If the gameentry module is not found at 1910, the software components do not existon the gaming terminal and the game is removed from the menu 1912,whereupon the process iterates to next game, as suggested at 1926 1928.If the execution of the game entry module is denied at 1916, 1918because the Software Restriction Policy is preventing this game toexecute, the game is removed from the menu as shown at 1920 and theprocess iterates to next game, as shown at 1926 1928. If the executionof the game entry module is successful at 1922, then the game isauthorized and may be added to the games menu offered to the player. Theprocess iterates through other games in the list, as shown at 1928,1930, 1942, 1906, if any. Once the iteration is completed at 1932, thegames menu may be composed at 1934 and the menu is displayed to theplayer at 1936.

FIG. 20 shows a companion Hello component, according to another aspectof the present invention. Reference numeral 2000 in FIG. 20 illustratesa method to generate a code signed companion software component. Eachgame comprises an aggregate of executable and non-executable softwarecomponents, usually comprising files such as *.exe, *.dll, *.dat, *.xml.In general, all the software components are dependent of one componentnamed the main program or the game entry. Starting the execution of themain game component is a lengthy process, as a large number of dependentexecutable components and graphics need to be verified (SRPverification) and started. Currently, there is no API available in theWindows operating system client computer for verifying the status of aSoftware Restriction Policy enforcement on a given software componentapplicable to that client computer.

Another embodiment of the present invention, therefore, provides amethod to quickly verify the policy enforcement on a game withoutstarting the entire game, in order to generate the list of availablegames to be made available to the player in a menu. For each game, avery short companion .dll file may be created having, for example, onlyone line of code <<Return “HELLO”>> which would return the exemplary“HELLO” string when called. Assuming “Infinity.dll” 2010 is the maingame component file name 2002 (or friendly name), then the companionfile may be named “Infinity.Hello.dll” 2018. Preferably, the companion's2018 source code would have in its assembly information a part number2004 as shown at 2020 and a version number 2006 as shown at 2022 that isidentical to the main component 2010 part number 2012 and a versionnumber 2014, but this is not mandatory. In addition, assuming the PKIcertificate's subject name 2008 associated to the Infinity.dll is“GDS.exe.0099-0001-00[1.0.101.0] Infinity.dll” 2016, which is used forthe code signing of the Infinity.dll, we may proceed with the codesigning of Infinity.Hello.dll with the same 2026, 2028“GDS.exe.0099-0001-00[1.0.101.0] Infinity.dll” certificate, as shown at2024.

It is to be noted that code signing two distinct software executableswith the same certificate is a deviation from the method taught earlierin this document. However, the fact that the role of the companion fileis very well defined, as having for example only one line of code<<Return “HELLO”>> which would return the “HELLO” string when called,this does not present an issue with the regulators or the certificationlab.

FIG. 21 shows steps that may be carried out to search for games on eachgaming terminal, according to yet another embodiment of the presentinvention. Reference numeral 2100 in FIG. 21 illustrates a method toquickly generate dynamically the list of games installed on each gamingterminal using the companion software component described above. Theprocess of dynamically generating the game selection menu may beoptimized in many ways in order to reduce the overhead of starting theexecution of a game to check if it is authorized. However, if the aim isto sense for the enforced SRP or SIP applied to the game or detect localavailability of the game software components, then such optimizations(among other possible variations) should be considered to be within thescope of the invention as defined by the claims hereunder. According toan embodiment of the present invention, a method is presented herewithto quickly generate the list of available games to be made available tothe player in a menu without transfer of a file from the server.Reference 2100 is identical to reference 1900 in FIG. 19 except for thefirst process 2104 whereby a file search process is performed forfinding (or enumerating) file names with the “*Hello.dll” string, the“*” symbol being the standard wild character used in string searches. Alist of the games installed on each gaming terminal may be quickly anddynamically generated by calling the companion software component of thegame main component instead of calling the main component itself. Thecompanion component may be as detailed at FIG. 20 or may be a similarconstruct.

The embodiments of the present invention described herein are alsoapplicable to any of the subsystems available in a network connectedgaming system that require preventing non-authorized software componentsto execute or affect game outcome, such as the gaming terminals, thegame management system (CMS or MCS) that monitor and control whole orpart of the estate of gaming machines, the progressive jackpot systems,the bonussing systems as well as game payment verification systems suchas IGT EasyPay and Cyberview PVU (Payment Verification Unit) and PVS(Payment Verification System). Gaming subsystems are tested againstgaming standards such as those produced by GLI (Game LaboratoryInternational); the game standards are mandated by game regulators inaccordance with local regulation and laws. The network-connectedsubsystems may be located within the premises accommodating the estateof gaming machines (connection via a LAN) or outside of the premises(connection via a WAN).

The methods described in the document rely on software installationpolicies and Software Restriction Policies which may be configured (a)via the domain controller active directory, as this is advantageouslythe case whenever the network connection is a LAN, and which may also beconfigured (b) to each of the local computers via WMI services (WindowsManagement Instrumentation) or administrative templates (.adm files) inorder to configure and enforce local group policies when a domaincontroller is not available as this is the case whenever the networkconnection is a WAN. Microsoft SMS (Systems Management Server) may beused as an alternative to using software installation policies.

The methods described in the document leverage on software installationpolicies and/or software restriction policies technology implemented inMicrosoft Windows operating system. Whenever similar technology isimplemented in other operating systems such as Linux, Unix, Windows CEand QNX, it is considered as part of the invention herein.

In an other embodiment of the invention, it order to make gameregulators more at ease with the huge shift in paradigm from prehensilephysically secured ROM based gaming machines (whereby access to the ROMis via multiple layers of keys locks and tamper detectors), to a totallyvirtual or volatile fashion of downloading game code via a network, itmay be advantageous to perform download of the game code when the gamingmachine is not operational. Consequently, the network downloading ofgame code from a central repository may not interfere with the games.This is accomplish by terminating all gaming software in order totransform the gaming machine into a generic PC, then transferring thegame software under the control of the operating system using pervasivenetwork code download available in most information technology networkedenvironments. An “Out-of-service” message may be displayed on the screento indicate that the machine is no longer playable, thus is no longer agaming machine. Once the game code is downloaded by the generic PC, thegame code is verified for trustworthiness and is executed, thustransforming the generic PC back into a gaming machine.

1. A method for a gaming machine in a network connected gaming system togenerate a menu of authorized games available to players, the methodcomprising the steps of: generating a unique code signed PKI certificatefor a predetermined software module of each authorized game; generatingan executable companion file for each authorized game, wherein theexecutable companion file is configured to execute faster than theauthorized game; code signing both the predetermined software module andits executable companion file with the generated PKI certificate;enforcing software restriction policy rules for preventingnon-authorized software components from executing; enforcing softwarerestriction policy rules for enabling execution of selected ones of theauthorized games; attempting to execute each executable companion file,and adding only those games to the menu of authorized games whoseexecutable companion file has not been denied execution by the softwarerestriction policy rules.
 2. A method according to claim 1 furthercomprising the step of removing games from the menu of authorized gameswhose companion file is denied execution by the software restrictionpolicy rules.
 3. A method according to claim 1, further comprising thestep of removing games from the menu of authorized games whose companionexecutable file is not found.
 4. A method for scheduling at least oneauthorized executable software component according to claim 1, whereinthe code signing uses a separate and unique PKI certificate for each ofthe at least one installation package.
 5. A method for scheduling atleast one authorized executable software component according to claim 1,wherein a menu is constructed using the list stored in a file.